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Abstract
Decisions in everyday life are commonly made using a combination of descrip-
tive and experiential information, and these two sources of information fre-
quently contradict each other. However, decision-making research has mostly
focused on description-only or experience-only tasks. Three experiments
show that individuals exposed to description and experience simultaneously
are influenced by both, particularly in situations in which descriptions are
in conflict with experience. We examined cognitive models of how people in-
tegrate their experience with descriptions of choice outcomes, with different
weights given to each source of information. Experience was the dominant
source of information, but descriptions were taken into consideration, al-
beit at a discounted level, even after many trials. Models that included the
descriptive information fitted the human data more accurately than models
that did not. Wider implications for understanding how these two commonly
available sources of information are combined for daily decision-making are
discussed.
Keywords: decision-making, decisions from experience, reinforcement learn-
ing, repeated decisions, warning labels
The vast majority of human decision-making research to date has been based around
descriptive paradigms (Camilleri & Newell, 2009; Fantino & Navarro, 2012; Rakow, Demes,
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reading complete abstract descriptions of available options (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky,
1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). However in everyday life individuals are rarely presented
with such detailed unambiguous descriptions and instead make decisions based on their
own direct experiences in noisy environments. When making decisions based on experience,
individuals learn about the potential outcomes of their choices by observing samples of
outcomes over time (e.g., Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; Knox, Otto,
Stone, & Love, 2012; Yechiam & Rakow, 2012).
Much of the research on decisions from description has dealt with factors that influence
people’s risky decision making. Thus, typically, experimental participants have been asked
to choose between a risky option and a sure option or between a high-risk option and a low-
risk option. For example, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) report studies of this type when
providing their rationale for the development of Prospect Theory. Concurrently, decisions
from experience have been mostly used in research on learning, exploration, exploitation,
and cognitive modeling. For example, all of these processes have been extensively studied
using the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara et al., 1994), which is a frequently employed risky-
choice task based on decisions from experience. Before Barron and Erev (2003), these two
approaches had mostly been studied separately, with little overlap. However, from the start
of the research confronting these two types of experimental paradigms, those interested in
how decisions from experience differ from decisions from description have focused on the
same issues. For example, Barron and Erev used experiential paradigms to explore many
of the same risky choices initially presented by Kahneman and Tversky using descriptions.
Thus, risky decision making provides a common thread that links classic literature on
descriptive decision making with more recent research on decisions from experience.
If the core relevant information about outcomes is the same, in particular the quan-
titative information such as probabilities and values of outcomes, then there should be no
differences in behavior according to how the information is presented. However this does not
always appear to be the case. Recent research confronting description and experience has
found significant differences between choices made from experience and those made from
description when the two sources carry the same information about the outcomes (e.g., Bar-
ron & Erev, 2003; Hau, Pleskac, & Hertwig, 2010; Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004).
This phenomenon has been named the “description-experience gap” by Hertwig and Erev
(2009), and there has been growing interest in this field recently (for reviews, see Camilleri
& Newell, 2013b; Rakow & Newell, 2010). Despite strong support, some studies still failed
to find any behavioral differences between decisions from description and decisions from
experience (e.g., Camilleri & Newell, 2011, 2013a; Fox & Hadar, 2006; Rakow et al., 2008),
raising new issues to be explored regarding the mechanisms that contribute towards the
appearance of gaps. For example, one such issue is how the two different sources of infor-
mation are processed and integrated together when they are both available simultaneously.
However, research on the description-experience gap also kept the two paradigms separate
by presenting different participants with either description-only or experience-only tasks in
isolation (for a review, see Fantino & Navarro, 2012).
Decisions in everyday life are commonly made using a combination of descriptive and
experiential information. For example, doctors frequently rely on readings of published
literature and research, which can be considered a form of description, and combine it with
their own clinical experience, when prescribing drugs or assessing the risk of a medical
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procedure (Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989). Consumers may base their buying decisions on
a combination of descriptive reviews and experiences of similar items bought in the past.
Warning labels can be considered as descriptive information that is added to an individual’s
own experience. Limited published research so far has looked at the influence of descriptions
when participants have access to both description and experience at the same time, with
contradictory results. According to a study by Lejarraga and Gonzalez (2011), descriptive
information is neglected when experience is also available. In contrast, Barron, Leider, and
Stack (2008) showed that providing participants with descriptive information influenced
behavior.
The extant “description-and-experience” research used paradigms in which the de-
scription matched the experience, with both based on the same underlying distribution of
outcomes and providing participants with the same basic information. That is, the de-
scription was a verbal representation of the distribution of payoffs actually experienced by
the participants. The researchers therefore had to rely on observing differences in behavior
based on the existence of a robust description-experience gap and its theoretical predictions
to test whether description or experience was influencing participants: Behavior consistent
with underweighting of rare events would be expected from participants following experi-
ence, while overweighting would be associated with descriptive information being used. For
example, Lejarraga and Gonzalez (2011) mention that, when providing participants with
both description and experience simultaneously, they observed behavior consistent with un-
derweighting of the rare event. According to the authors, this is evidence that experience
was taken into account, but description was neglected: Previous research has associated the
underweighting of rare events with decisions from experience (Hertwig & Erev, 2009), while
the overweighting of rare events observed has subsequently been associated with decisions
from description (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
However, recent research in this area has explored the idea that the gap is likely a
product of differences between the experimental paradigms. Descriptive tasks typically rely
on single-shot paradigms without feedback, while experiential tasks tend to use repeated-
choice paradigms with feedback (Camilleri & Newell, 2013a; Jessup, Bishara, & Busemeyer,
2008). Therefore, the overweighting and underweighting of rare events may not be nec-
essarily driven by the mere presence or absence of descriptions, respectively, but instead
by the different nature of the paradigms used in each line of research. In both studies
mentioned in the previous paragraph, the paradigms used were repeated-choice experien-
tial tasks with feedback. We suggest that the reason why Lejarraga and Gonzalez (2011)
observed behavior explicable by underweighting of rare events is not because participants
neglected the descriptions, but because the paradigm used was typical of experiential re-
search. Furthermore, the reason why the authors did not observe any differences in behavior
in their experiment is not because description was neglected, but because it conveyed the
same information as experience and therefore its influence on behavior was not observable.
Barron et al. (2008) observed a difference in behavior in their experiment because the rare
event in their description, with a chance of 1 in 1000, rarely or never occurred.
We present an experimental paradigm in which description conflicts with experience,
which will allow us to verify how different sources of information influence behavior. If each
source provides different information to participants then, by analyzing the choice patterns,
we can determine which one has been used in the decision process. These situations of
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conflicting information are likely to be representative of typical day-to-day decision making
in a dynamic world. In such ever changing environments, the more adaptive short-term
nature of experience, which tends to rely on small samples (Hertwig & Pleskac, 2010),
compared to the relatively more static long-term nature of description, which tend to rely
on large samples (e.g., published results from randomized control trials), would naturally
lead to the two diverging over time 1. Experience allows for continuous learning of the
environment; this is not the case with descriptions, which typically take longer to be updated
and can quickly become out of date, leading to negative impacts on choices made in changing
environments (Rakow & Miler, 2009). Sampling biases can also create mismatches between
description and experience, in particular when rare events are involved (Fox & Hadar, 2006;
Hertwig et al., 2004).
Even with large samples, the representative set behind a description can differ from
an individual’s particular experience, depending on the source of the description. Glasgow
et al. (2006) and Kamal and Peppercorn (2013) discuss the external validity of medical
research findings, which are typically used as reference points for decision-making, but are
not always applicable to a doctor’s more localized clinical experience. This is especially
true for doctors who have to deal with patient populations that are not representative of
the reference population in the standard description. Rakow, Vincent, Bull, and Harvey
(2005) showed how mortality risk assessments based on reference research conducted in
the Unites States differed from personal experience of doctors at a selected hospital in the
United Kingdom. Other examples can result from the overzealous usage of warning signs
which misrepresent risks, for example by describing a risk as likely when in reality it is
rarely experienced. Carson and Mannering (2001) mention the overuse of road traffic ice
warning signs in locations where ice is rarely observed.
If such mismatches between description and experience are encountered frequently,
understanding how individuals deal with these situations is crucial for ecologically valid
research with real life practical implications. For example, warning labels can be considered
descriptive information that conflicts with experience, since they typically present rare
events that are not observed directly by the majority of individuals. Research “suggests
that the warning labels’ impact on behavioral compliance is not as clear as expected”
(Argo & Main, 2004, p. 193), with a potential explanation for warning label ineffectiveness
being that “[i]f the information in a warning contradicts one’s existing beliefs, the warning
information might be discounted” (Rogers, Lamson, & Rousseau, 2000, p.130).
The experiments and cognitive models in this study were designed to investigate the
hypothesis that descriptions are not neglected by individuals when both description and
experience are available, and that descriptions are partially discounted. The allocation of
different weights to description and experience has been suggested before (Barron et al.,
2008; Newell & Rakow, 2007; Shlomi, 2014). In support of these suggestions, research
has shown that descriptions can be overwhelmed by experience (Jessup et al., 2008), and
decision makers seem to prefer experiential information (Lejarraga, 2010). Concordantly,
1We thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting that in a new world of more dynamic on-line infor-
mation sharing such divergences can also occur in the opposite direction. For instance, when considering
customer reviews on web pages, reviews constantly accumulate, affecting the overall mean rating of a prod-
uct, leading to more dynamic descriptive information. Conversely, experiences might remain static if a
person is simply no longer exposed to similar situations in the future.
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experience is easier to process cognitively (Glöckner, Fiedler, Hochman, Ayal, & Hilbig,
2012), with personal experiences evoking strong emotional and visceral reactions, vis-à-vis
statistical descriptions, which lead to more detached analytic considerations (Weber, 2006).
We also introduce a Bayesian-updating cognitive model which combines description and
experience with different weights, allowing the weighting to change over time according to
the plausibility of the descriptive information. The combination of behavioral observations
and cognitive modeling of the results from our experiments helps to shed additional light
on how description and experience are integrated during the decision-making process.
Experiment 1
Method
Design. The first experiment had a 4 × 2 between-subjects design: four types of
information presentation and two levels of probabilities for the risky option. Information
was presented in one of the following: the description-only (D) condition; the experience-
only (E) condition; the description-experience-same (DES) condition; and the description-
experience-conflict (DEC) condition. The two levels of probabilities referred to the risky
option: the 80% probability condition provided participants with a reward 80% of the time
(and no reward otherwise), and the 20% probability condition had a 20% chance of providing
the reward. Each participant was presented with only one type of information presentation
and only one level of probability.
Participants. 172 participants (67 females; age: M = 32 years, SD = 10 years) were
recruited on-line using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service. Participation was restricted to
individuals whose location was defined as in the United States. There were 28 participants
in the D20%E80%C condition, 24 in the D80% condition, and 20 each in the remaining
six conditions (D80%E20%C, D80%E80%S, D20%E20%S, E80%, E20%, and D20%; subscripts
indicate the probability levels used in the description D and experience E, whilst C stands
for conflicting and S stands for same). No participants were excluded from the analysis.
Participants were paid a fixed amount of US$ 0.25 for participating and an additional bonus
according to the outcomes of the choices they made during the experiment (Bonus: M =
US$ 0.71, SD = US$ 0.12)2.
Task. Participants were initially presented with an instructions screen with informa-
tion about the task. They were told that the task involved choosing between two on-screen
buttons, with each button associated with a gamble paying rewards with a certain chance.
The idea of conflicting descriptions was introduced as follows:“Because of the way that com-
puters generate random numbers, sometimes the actual frequency that you will experience
of winning rewards might not be the same as the one indicated. Ideally, it should be the
same, but sometimes it can fluctuate both up and down. It is up to you to assess how
attractive each button is based on the actual rewards you get from clicking it. Choosing
wisely between the two gambles, in order to maximize your points, will help you increase
your bonus.”
2Bonus amount in Experiment 1 was not influenced by the probability level condition (80%: 0.71; 20%:
0.70; F (1, 164) = 0.587, p = .44), but it was influenced by the information presentation condition, with a
significantly lower overall bonus in the DEC condition (D: 0.69; E: 0.73; DES: 0.74; DEC: 0.67; F (3, 164) =
4.111, p = .008).
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After reading the instructions, participants were then presented with two buttons
side by side on screen: one button provided the participant with the sure outcome of two
points 100% of the time, and the other button was a risky gamble which gave participants
five points either 20% or 80% of the time, depending on the experimental condition, and
zero points otherwise. Safe and risky button locations were counterbalanced between par-
ticipants. Choices were made using the mouse. All of the participants’ choices between the
two options were financially consequent and accumulated towards their final pay. Points
were converted to money at a rate of US$ 0.20/100 points in the 80% condition and US$
0.40/100 points in the 20% condition3. Accumulated amounts in points and US dollars were
shown on-screen and updated after each choice was made. Participants completed the task
in an average of 7.0 minutes (SD = 3.5 minutes).
Table 1
Button labels according to condition in Experiment 1
Experimental Safe choice Risky choice
conditions button label button label
E80%, E20% (blank) (blank)
D80%, D80%E80%S, 2 points with 100% probability. 5 points with 80% probability;
D80%E20%C Zero otherwise.
D20%, D20%E20%S, 2 points with 100% probability. 5 points with 20% probability;
D20%E80%C Zero otherwise.
In the description-only (D) conditions, each button had a label that provided partic-
ipants with a description of the underlying distribution of outcomes, as detailed in Table
1. Participants were told to choose one button once, and that their selection would be
repeated by the computer 100 times, each time drawing from the underlying distribution
of the option chosen, to calculate their total bonus (Camilleri & Newell, 2013a).
The experiential conditions (E, DES and DEC) involved 100 repeated individual
choices. After each trial, participants were given full feedback, with both the earned and
foregone outcomes displayed in the relevant buttons, and asked to choose again. In the
E conditions, the two buttons were blank. In the DEC and DES conditions, the buttons
contained descriptive labels, as detailed in Table 1. In the DES conditions, the description
matched the experience: the outcomes of each choice were drawn from the same distribution
as that described in the button. In the DEC conditions, the description for the risky choice
showed a probability level opposite to the one used to draw the experiential outcomes after
each choice. For example, participants in the D80%E20%C condition were shown a risky
button with a description (D) that indicated an 80% probability of winning five points.
However the actual gains experienced (E) by participants for the risky choice were drawn
with a 20% probability distribution. In this condition, the conflicting description made the
choice more attractive than it was in reality. The situation was reversed in the D20%E80%C
condition, with the conflicting description making the risky choice appear less attractive
(D=20%, E=80%).
3We used different exchange rates according to condition to ensure that all subjects could earn a similar
amount of money for their participation in our task, by keeping the financial expected value of the highest
earning gamble equal to US$0.80 regardless of condition, across all experiments in this study.
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In order to avoid sampling biases, samples were pseudo-randomized in groups of 10
outcomes each, for each participant. Within each 10 outcomes, the samples were yoked to
perfectly represent the exact appropriate level of reward events expected in the underlying
distribution, either eight or two observations (80% and 20% conditions respectively), in a
randomized order (Camilleri & Newell, 2011).
Results and Discussion
The main dependent variable was the proportion of risky choices (R-rate). The R-rate
was calculated as the average proportion of times that participants selected the risky option
for each block of 20 trials.
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Figure 1 . Evolution of the risky choice rate (R-rate) for each block of 20 trials for Experiment 1. The left
panel shows the results when the risky choice paid a reward of five points 80% of the time, while in the right
panel the same reward was paid 20% of the time. The lines refer to the different descriptions presented to
participants (E: experience only, no description; DES: description and experience same; DEC: description
and experience conflicting). The X refers to the description-only condition, which involved a single choice
on the first trial.
The main analysis was conducted separately for each experienced probability condi-
tion (80% and 20%). The R-rates in each block were analyzed with a generalized linear
mixed-effects model (assuming a binomial distribution with a logit link function) using the
lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014) in R (R Core Team, 2014). The
between-subjects conditions were the types of information presentation (E, DES or DEC).
The D condition was excluded from the quantitative analysis because of the different nature
of the paradigm, since it involved only one decision without feedback, which is not directly
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comparable to the repeated decisions of the other conditions (Mean R-rates: D80%: 67%;
D20%: 20%). The within-subjects conditions were the blocks of 20 choices each. For each
participant, the model contained a random intercept and a random slope for the effect of
each block. This approach was used to capture the nested structure of the data. The ran-
dom intercept accounts for differences in individual overall levels of risky choices and the
random slope for differences in changes from block to block for each participant.
The main effect of information presentation condition on R-rates was significant for
both probability levels (Figure 1). In the 80% probability condition, R-rates were lowest
in the DEC condition (DEC: 70%; DES: 94%; E: 85%;χ2(2) = 31.33, p < .001). In the
20% condition, R-rates were highest in the DEC condition (DEC: 40%; DES: 24%; E: 21%;
χ2(2) = 17.50, p < .001). The main effect of block was also significant for both probability
levels. In the 80% probability condition, R-rates increased over time (χ2(4) = 37.73, p <
.001). In the 20% condition, R-rates decreased over time (χ2(4) = 37.94, p < .001). The
interactive effect of block and information condition was not significant in either probability
condition (χ2(8)s< 7.73, ps> .46).
A post-hoc analysis for the last block of 20 trials was also conducted, for each of the
two levels of probability separately, in order to compare the effects of the three different
types of information presentation conditions (DEC, DES and E). It is of particular interest
to look at the R-rates in the last block since by then participants can be expected to have
stabilized in their preferred choice (Bechara et al., 1994; Ert & Erev, 2007). There was a
marginally significant difference between the DES and the E conditions in the 80% condition
(DES: 94%; E: 90%; χ2(1) = 4.35, p = .04, ϕc = .07), but no difference in the 20% condition
(DES: 21%; E: 16%; χ2(1) = 2.71, p = .10, ϕc = .06), with small effect sizes in both cases.
The presence of descriptive information congruent to experience influenced behavior weakly
or not at all, consistent with the results observed by Lejarraga and Gonzalez (2011).
However, in the DEC conditions, which combined conflicting information from de-
scription and from experience, participants’ behavior was shifted towards the choice pre-
dicted from the descriptive button labels, as observed in the relevant E and DES experimen-
tal conditions, and away from the choice observed in the other conditions. For example,
if the D20% description in the D20%E80%C condition was influencing behavior, we would
expect a shift away from the behavior observed in the D80%E80%S and the E80% conditions
and towards what was observed in the D20%E20%C and E20% conditions, and vice-versa
for the D80%E20%C condition. This effect was observed. In the 80% condition, the DEC
condition made the risky choice less attractive by describing a lower probability of rewards
than experienced, and in the 20% it made it more attractive. Therefore we would expect a
decrease in R-rates in the 80% condition and an increase in the 20% condition. In the 80%
probability condition, R-rates in the DEC condition were significantly lower than in the
other two conditions (DEC: 80%; DES: 94%; E: 90%; χ2(2) = 45.98, p < .001, ϕc = .18). A
similar but mirrored effect was observed in the 20% condition, where R-rates in the DEC
condition were significantly higher (DEC: 31%; DES: 21%; E: 16%; χ2(2) = 28.09, p < .001,
ϕc = .15).
The conflicting descriptive information influenced behavior significantly, with strong
effect sizes, and in the direction predicted by the misleading information provided. This
behavior could be explained by participants taking into account the descriptive information
and integrating it with the experiential information into their decision-making process. If
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participants were disregarding the descriptive information completely, the R-rates should
not have differed between the comparable DEC, DES and E conditions for each probability
level, since the experienced feedback in these three conditions was the same.
The behavior observed in the DEC conditions was also shifted towards what could
be interpreted as a more random pattern, with R-rates closer to 50% than in the respective
DES and E conditions. We propose that this shift is towards more predicted behavior as
inferred by the conflicting descriptions, with participants being influenced by the content
of the information available in the descriptions. However, other reasons might cause a
similar shift towards random behavior, as a result of the increase in uncertainty in the
DEC conditions. The conflicting information introduced further uncertainty into the task,
and uncertainty can make participants believe less in their own experience and also explore
more often, which could lead to more random-like behavior (Erev & Barron, 2005; Knox et
al., 2012; Speekenbrink & Konstantinidis, 2015). In order to test if participants were being
influenced by the content of the conflicting description, or simply behaving more randomly,
we devised Experiment 2 in which the conflicting information should influence participants
away from randomness.
Experiment 2
While in Experiment 1 the conflicting information influenced participants towards
what could potentially be interpreted as more random behavior, Experiment 2 was de-
signed so that the conflicting information should influence participants behavior away from
randomness. For example, in the 20% condition, when the conflicting information led to
an increase in the risky choice rates (R-rates), the control R-rates (in the E and DES con-
ditions, without the conflicting information) were initially below the random point of 50%;
and above random for the 80% condition, when R-rates decreased. The new design used
a paradigm in which an increase in the R-rate would be associated with an initial R-rate
higher than 50% (Experiment 2a), and a decrease in R-rate associated with an initial R-
rate lower than 50% (Experiment 2b). In this way, conflicting descriptions should move the
observed behavior away from randomness.
Method
Design. These experiments used a 3 × 2 between-subjects designs with three types
of information presentation and two levels of probabilities in the risky option. Information
was presented in one of the following: the experience-only (E) condition; the description-
experience-same (DES) condition; or the description-experience-conflict (DEC) condition.
The two levels of probabilities of the risky option were changed from Experiment 1: in Ex-
periment 2a the probabilities used were 80% and 40%, and in Experiment 2b they were 40%
and 20%. Each participant was presented with only one type of information presentation
and only one level of probability.
Participants. Participants were recruited on-line using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
service. Participation was restricted to individuals whose location was defined as in the
United States. No participants were excluded from the analysis. Participants were paid
a fixed amount of US$ 0.25 for participating and an additional bonus according to the
outcomes of the choices they made during the experiment.
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Experiment 2a. 120 individuals participated (63 females; age: M = 34 years, SD
= 11 years), 20 in each experimental condition. Average bonus paid was US$ 0.90 (SD =
US$ 0.06)4.
Experiment 2b. 120 individuals participated (43 females; age: M = 31 years, SD
= 9 years), 20 in each experimental condition. Average bonus paid was US$ 0.55 (SD =
US$ 0.18)5.
Task. The experimental paradigm was similar to that of Experiment 1, the only
differences being the new values and probabilities for the risky option. The safe button still
paid a sure outcome of two points 100% of the time in both experiments. In Experiment
2a, the risky choice paid rewards of six points either 80% or 40% of the time, according to
the probability level condition. In Experiment 2b, the risky choice paid four points either
40% or 20% of the time. The new outcomes and button labels can be seen in Table 2.
Points were converted to money at a rate of US$ 0.20/100 points in Experiment 2a and
US$0.40/100 points in Experiment 2b. Participants completed the task in an average of 6.1
minutes (SD = 2.6 minutes).
Table 2
Button labels according to condition in Experiment 2
Experimental Safe choice Risky choice
conditions button label button label
Experiment 2a
E80%, E40% (blank) (blank)
D80%E80%S, 2 points with 100% probability. 6 points with 80% probability;
D80%E40%C Zero otherwise.
D40%E40%S, 2 points with 100% probability. 6 points with 40% probability;
D40%E80%C Zero otherwise.
Experiment 2b
E40%, E20% (blank) (blank)
D40%E40%S, 2 points with 100% probability. 4 points with 40% probability;
D40%E20%C Zero otherwise.
D20%E20%S, 2 points with 100% probability. 4 points with 20% probability;
D20%E40%C Zero otherwise.
Results and Discussion
As in Experiment 1, the main dependent variable was the average proportion of times
individuals selected the risky choice (R-rate), in blocks of 20. The same analysis that was
4Bonus amount in Experiment 2a was not influenced by the information presentation condition (E: 0.90;
DEC: 0.90; DES: 0.90;F (2, 114) = 0.079, p = .92), but it was influenced by the probability level condition,
with a significantly lower overall bonus in the 40% condition (80%: 0.92; 40%: 0.89; F (1, 114) = 7.538, p =
.007).
5Bonus amount in Experiment 2b was not influenced by the information presentation condition (E: 0.54;
DEC: 0.55; DES: 0.54;F (2, 114) = 0.732, p = .48), but it was influenced by the probability level condition,
with a significantly lower overall bonus in the 40% condition (40%: 0.37; 20%: 0.72; F (1, 114) = 1164, p <
.001).
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used in Experiment 1 was conducted separately for Experiments 2a and 2b.
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Figure 2 . Evolution of the risky choice rate (R-rate) for each block of 20 trials for Experiment 2a. The left
panel shows the results when the risky choice paid a reward of six points 80% of the time, while in the right
panel the same reward was paid 40% of the time. The lines refer to the different descriptions presented to
participants (E: experience only, no description; DES: description and experience same; DEC: description
and experience conflicting).
Experiment 2a. The main effect of information presentation condition was signif-
icant for both probability levels. In the 80% probability level, R-rates were lower in the
DEC condition (χ2(2) = 12.29, p = .002) but mostly influenced by the behavior in the first
block (DEC: 75%; DES: 91%; E: 86%; χ2(2) = 42.25, p < .001). While in the 40% prob-
ability level, R-rates in the DEC condition were higher throughout the blocks, and away
from randomness (DEC: 72%; DES: 57%; E: 48%; χ2(2) = 23.20, p < .001). The influence
of conflicting descriptions was observed throughout all blocks in the 40% condition, but
only in the first block in the 80% condition (Figure 2). The main effect of block was sig-
nificant in the 80% probability condition, with R-rates increasing over time (χ2(4) = 45.15,
p < .001), but not significant in the 40% condition (χ2(4) = 7.57, p = .11). The interactive
effect of block and information condition was not significant in either probability condition
(χ2(8)s< 4.50, ps> .80).
A post-hoc analysis for the last block was also conducted, for each of the two levels of
probability, comparing the three types of information presentation conditions. In the 80%
probability conditions, there were no significant differences between the R-rates according to
condition (DEC: 97%; DES: 96%; E: 97%; χ2(2) = 0.05, p = .98, ϕc = .01). The availability
of descriptive information, both congruent and conflicting, did not seem to move behavior
away from that predicted by experience alone in the last block; its effect was restricted
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to the first block as mentioned before. In the 40% probability conditions, R-rates in the
DEC condition were significantly higher than in the other two conditions (DEC: 75%; DES:
60%; E: 52%; χ2(2) = 47.94, p < .001, ϕc = .20). Conflicting descriptions influenced
behavior significantly, in the direction predicted by the descriptive information provided.
The descriptive information presented a probability of rewards for the risky option higher
than experienced, so an increase in R-rates was expected. There was a marginally significant
difference in R-rates between the DES and E conditions (DES: 60%; E: 52%; χ2(1) = 4.56,
p = .03, ϕc = .08), albeit with a small effect size.
Experiment 2b. The main effect of information presentation condition was signif-
icant for the 40% probability levels (χ2(2) = 13.33, p < .01), with lower R-rates in the DEC
condition, and away from randomness (DEC: 28%; DES: 37%; E: 40%). In contrast, the
main effect of information presentation condition was not significant for the 20% probability
levels (χ2(2) = 1.66, p = .44), with no significant differences in R-rates across conditions
(DEC: 16%; DES: 18%; E: 16%). The influence of conflicting descriptions was observed in
the 40% condition, but not in the 20% condition (Figure 3). The main effect of block was
not significant in the 40% probability condition (χ2(4) = 2.62, p = .62), and significant in
the 20% condition, with a reduction of R-rates over time (χ2(4) = 42.08, p < .001). The
interactive effect of block and information condition was marginally significant in the 40%
condition (χ2(8) = 13.91, p = .08) and significant in the 20% condition (χ2(8) = 16.21,
p = .04). This effect was a result of the reduction in R-rates over time in the E conditions.
A post-hoc analysis for the last block was also conducted, for each of the two levels
of probability, comparing the three types of information presentation conditions. In the
40% probability conditions, R-rates in the DEC condition were significantly lower than in
the other two conditions (DEC: 26%; DES: 41%; E: 37%; χ2(2) = 21.06, p < .001, ϕc =
.13). Conflicting descriptions influenced behavior significantly, in the direction predicted by
the descriptive information provided. The descriptive information presented a probability
lower than experienced, so a decrease in R-rates was expected. There were no significant
differences between the DES and E conditions (DES: 41%; E: 37%; χ2(1) = 1.52, p = .22,
ϕc = .04), therefore congruent descriptions did not significantly influence behavior. In
the 20% probability conditions, there were no significant differences between the R-rates
according to condition (DEC: 10%; DES: 15%; E: 11%; χ2(2) = 5.64, p = .06, ϕc = .07).
The presence of different types of information did not seem to influence behavior strongly
in this condition.
Discussion. The influence of conflicting description on behavior was observed in
the 40% condition of Experiment 2a and the 40% condition of Experiment 2b. In these
conditions, the conflicting description made the maximizing choice more attractive by in-
creasing the difference in expected value between the risky and safe choices, and led to
significant changes in the R-rates, away from random behavior, in the direction expected
from the conflicting descriptions. In both of these conditions, the control R-rates (in the
DES and E conditions) were close to 50%. In Experiment 2a, the descriptive probability
of rewards of the risky option was higher than the experienced probability, and this led to
an increase in R-rates. In Experiment 2b, the opposite occurred, with a lower descriptive
probability leading to a reduction in the observed R-rates.
However no significant influence of conflicting description (relative to the E and DES
conditions) was observed in the 80% condition of Experiment 2a and the 20% condition of
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Figure 3 . Evolution of the risky choice rate (R-rate) for each block of 20 trials for Experiment 2b. The left
panel shows the results when the risky choice paid a reward of four points 40% of the time, while in the right
panel the same reward was paid 20% of the time. The lines refer to the different descriptions presented to
participants (E: experience only, no description; DES: description and experience same; DEC: description
and experience conflicting).
Experiment 2b. Instead we observed a ceiling effect in Experiment 2a and a floor effect in
Experiment 2b, with R-rates close to 100% in the former and close to 10% in the latter
regardless of experimental condition. In comparison to Experiment 1, which provided the
same probabilities of reward (five points with 80% and 20%), in Experiment 2a participants
could earn more points (six points) and in Experiment 2b fewer points (four points). These
changes led to an increase and decrease of R-rates respectively in comparison to Experiment
1, resulting in the ceiling and floor effects.
The opportunity cost of complying with warning labels seems to moderate behavior
(Argo & Main, 2004) and also needs to be taken into account: In the 80% condition of
Experiment 2a and the 20% condition of Experiment 2b, the expected value of one option
was considerably higher than the other, and hence complying with the misleading descrip-
tion (which would lead to deviation from optimal behavior) was more costly. In addition,
the influence of descriptive information might have been given less importance than that
of experiential information, as previously suggested (Jessup et al., 2008; Lejarraga, 2010;
Rogers et al., 2000; Shlomi, 2014). Descriptions, if discounted, would have less influence on
behavior when the difference in expected values is higher, and this would explain the be-
havior observed. The discounting of descriptions will be further investigated in Experiment
3 and in the cognitive modeling section below.
INCORPORATING CONFLICTING DESCRIPTIONS 14
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, we aimed to verify the boundaries of the influence of conflicting
descriptive information. We propose that the influence of conflicting descriptions would be
monotonically increasing at the center, but not at extreme levels of informational conflict.
In extreme cases when information is highly implausible, it should be more readily discarded
from the decision-making process. This could lead to a reduced marginal influence or even a
contrasting effect at the extremes, similar to what has been found in research on anchoring
(e.g., Chapman & Johnson, 1994), advice seeking (e.g., Yaniv, 2004), goal setting (e.g.,
Locke, 1982), and psychophysics (e.g., Brown, 1953). In order to check how a description’s
plausibility influences behavior, we created experimental conditions with varying levels of
conflict: no conflict, plausible conflict and implausible conflict.
Plausibility was manipulated via the difference between the actual experienced and
the verbally described frequencies of rewards. Across all conditions, the risky option re-
turned rewards 50% of the time. In the two plausible conflict conditions, descriptions
informed participants that rewards were paid either with a 25% or 75% probability, rel-
atively close to the true experienced frequency of 50%, making the descriptions plausible
explanations for the experience. In the two implausible conflict conditions, descriptions
informed participants that rewards were paid either with a 1% or 99% probability, which
were highly implausible given the experience. We expected participants to disregard the
descriptions more easily in the implausible conflict conditions, therefore reducing the effect
of their influence on their behavior.
Method
Design. This experiment followed a between-subjects design with six experimental
conditions, with manipulations of the descriptions that were provided to participants. Each
participant was presented with only one type of description, assigned randomly from the fol-
lowing options: the experience-only (E) condition; the description-experience-same (DES)
condition, in which the description matched the experience at 50% probability of receiving
a reward; two plausible conflict (DECp) conditions, with descriptive probabilities of 25%
and 75%; and two implausible conflict (DECi) conditions, with descriptive probabilities of
1% and 99%.
Participants. 240 participants (110 females; age: M = 33 years, SD = 11 years)
were recruited on-line using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service. Participation was restricted
to individuals whose location was defined as in the United States. There were 40 partic-
ipants in each experimental condition. No participants were excluded from the analysis.
Participants were paid a fixed amount of US$ 0.25 for participating and an additional
bonus according to the outcomes of the choices they made during the experiment. Average
bonus paid was US$ 0.80 (SD = US$ 0.03)6.
Task. The experimental paradigm was similar to that of Experiments 1 and 2, the
only differences being the new values and probabilities for the risky option. In this exper-
iment, the experience drew from the same underlying distributions across all conditions,
with the risky option returning 4 points with 50% probability, and the safe option returning
6Because the expected value of the safe and risky options were matched, there was no significant difference
in the bonus paid according to experimental condition (F (1, 238) = 0.259, p = .611).
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2 points with 100% probability. The expected values of the risky and safe options were the
same. The only between-subjects manipulation was the descriptive information. The new
outcomes and button labels can be seen in Table 3. Points were converted to money at a
rate of US$ 0.40/100 points. In addition, after participants had finished selecting between
the two choices, the descriptions (if previously present) were hidden and a blank text box
appeared under each button. Participants were asked to input their judgments for the
actual experienced frequencies of rewards for each button, in the range of 0-100%, using
the numbers in their keyboards. The removal of the descriptions from the screen was done
to reduce any potential anchoring effect, and avoid participants from simply copying the
descriptions as their answers. Participants completed the task in an average of 8.0 minutes
(SD = 5.6 minutes).
Table 3
Button labels according to condition in Experiment 3.
Description condition Safe choice Risky choice
of risky option button label button label
Experience-only (blank) (blank)
(E50%)
No conflict 2 points with 100% probability. 4 points with 50% probability;
(D50%E50%S) Zero otherwise.
Plausible conflict 25% 2 points with 100% probability. 4 points with 25% probability;
(D25%E50%Cp) Zero otherwise.
Plausible conflict 75% 2 points with 100% probability. 4 points with 75% probability;
(D75%E50%Cp) Zero otherwise.
Implausible conflict 1% 2 points with 100% probability. 4 points with 1% probability;
(D1%E50%Ci) Zero otherwise.
Implausible conflict 99% 2 points with 100% probability. 4 points with 99% probability;
(D99%E50%Ci) Zero otherwise.
Results and Discussion
As in Experiments 1 and 2, the main dependent variable was the average proportion
of times individuals selected the risky choice (R-rate). The same analysis that was used in
Experiments 1 and 2 was conducted for Experiment 3. The average judgments of the fre-
quency of reward appearances were also analyzed using a one-way ANOVA by experimental
condition.
The main effect of information presentation condition was significant. R-rates in-
creased with higher description levels (χ2(5) = 59.72, p < .001). The main effect of block
was not significant (χ2(4) = 4.21, p = .38), however the interaction of information and
block was significant (χ2(20) = 39.05, p = .007). A post-hoc analysis for the last block was
also conducted, comparing the R-rate in the DES condition against the five other types of
information presentation conditions (Figure 4(a)). As before, presenting participants with
congruent descriptions did not influence behavior in relation to no descriptions, in replica-
tion of the findings in Experiments 1 and 2 (DES: 48%; E: 50%; χ2(1) = 1.00, p = .32,
ϕc = .03).
In the plausible conflict conditions of 25% and 75%, we observed an associated change
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Figure 4 . Results from Experiment 3. Left panel (A): Proportion of risky choice (R-rates) in the last
block of 20 trials. Right panel (B): Frequency judgments for the appearance of rewards for the safe and
risky choices. Across all conditions, participants experienced a reward of 4 points 50% of the time for the
risky option and 2 points 100% of the time for the safe option. Experimental conditions refer to the de-
scriptions presented to participants for the risky option (E50%: experience-only, no description, D50%E50%S:
same description (50%), D25%E50%Cp: plausible conflicting description (25%), D75%E50%Cp: plausible con-
flicting description (75%), D1%E50%Ci: implausible conflicting description (1%), D99%E50%Ci: implausible
conflicting description (99%)).
in the R-rates as predicted by the directionality of the description. In the case of lower
probability of rewards in the risky option (25%) there was a reduction in the R-rate in
comparison to the DES condition (DECp: 33%; DES: 48%; χ2(1) = 39.34, p < .001,
ϕc = .16). In the case when participants were presented with a higher probability of reward
(75%) we observed an increase in the R-rate (DECp: 57%; DES: 48%; χ2(1) = 11.93,
p < .001, ϕc = .09). This suggests a monotonic influence of descriptions in the central
conditions.
In the implausible conflict conditions of 1% and 99%, we observed a reversal in the
influence of the conflicting descriptions. In the case of the 1% description, the R-rate was
significantly higher than in the plausible 25% condition (DECi: 41%; DECp: 33%; χ2(1) =
11.05, p < .001, ϕc = .08) and still significantly lower than in the DES condition (DECi:
41%; DES: 48%; χ2(1) = 8.82, p < .01, ϕc = .07). In the case of the 99% description, the
R-rate was lower than in the plausible condition, but only marginally significant (DECi:
52%; DECp: 57%; χ2(1) = 2.91, p = .09, ϕc = .04), and also only marginally significantly
higher than in the DES condition (DECi: 52%; DES: 48%; χ2(1) = 3.06, p = .08, ϕc = .04).
The frequency judgment of reward appearances was also analyzed, using a one-way
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ANOVA by experimental condition (Figure 4(b)). All participants experienced frequencies
of rewards of 100% for the safe choice and 50% for the risky choice, which would have been
their unbiased correct answers. For the safe choice, participants’ judgments were not dif-
ferent across the individual description conditions (M = 87%;F (4, 195) = 1.587, p = .179);
in the E condition however, their judgments were significantly lower (E: 67%; F (5, 234) =
5.851, p < .001). There was also a significant difference in the judgments for the risky choice
(F (5, 234) = 8.952, p < .001). This effect was analyzed with five polynomial contrasts: The
linear, quadratic and cubic contrasts were all significant (ps<.001); while the two remaining
higher order contrasts were not significant (ps>.52). This would indicate a sigmoid-shaped
monotonically increasing judgment in relation to the description: participants presented
with descriptions of higher probabilities of rewards responded with higher frequency judg-
ments of the observed rewards, with diminishing sensitivities at the extremes (see Figure
4(b)). The individual frequency judgments for the risky choice were also significantly cor-
related to the individual R-rates (r = .50, n = 238, p < .001).
The lack of influence of congruent descriptions and the significant influence of conflict-
ing descriptions on behavior were again observed in Experiment 3, replicating the results
found in Experiments 1 and 2. In addition, plausible conflicting descriptions influenced R-
rates in a monotonic way, with high described probabilities of rewards increasing R-rates,
and vice-versa. However, in the case of implausible conflicts, a contrast effect was observed.
A more extreme and more implausible described probability had a weaker effect on behav-
ior than a less extreme but plausible one. If the description is highly unlikely to be a true
representation of the experience, participants give it lower weight in their decision-making
process. These differences in decision weights will be specified with a cognitive model in
the next section.
Cognitive Modeling Analysis
To further test if participants integrate the descriptive information into their decision-
making processes, a set of cognitive computational models was fitted to the experimental
data. If the descriptive information influenced human behavior, then a model that includes
representations of both description and experience should fit better than a model that relies
on experience alone. We therefore compared experience-only against description-experience
models. Within the description-experience models, we tested two different approaches: a
fixed-weight approach, in which the weights given to description are fixed over time and over
conditions, and a Bayesian-updating approach, in which the weights given to description
change over time according to the plausibility of the evidence observed in contrast with the
description.
The Models
The aim of fitting a cognitive model to the data was to assess and formalize how the
two sources of information, descriptive and experiential, are combined. We did not aim to
have an extensive comparison between different decision-making models in decision making
paradigms (such as the one in Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005).
We fitted three models to the behavioral data. They all share the same basic structure,
which is defined by the final expected value FEVj(t) of each choice j available to participants
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at time t:
FEVj(t) = ξj(t) ·Dj + [1− ξj(t)] · Ej(t).
We propose that the two sources of information are combined via ξj(t), a parameter
which determines the weight given to description at each point in time for each option.
A representation of the descriptive information is included via Dj , which is the expected
value calculated from the descriptive information available to participants, using cumulative
prospect theory (CPT; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). The experience is represented by
Ej(t), which is the expected value calculated from the experiential information received
by participants in the form of feedback up to trial t, based on a delta-rule reinforcement
learning model.
Description (Dj)
The subjective expected value of the descriptive information for choice j, Dj , was
fixed over time and calculated as the CPT value based on the descriptions provided to
participants in the button labels. According to Tversky and Kahneman (1992), the CPT
value is calculated using the curvature parameter for values and weighting parameter for
probabilities, ν and ω respectively,
Dj =
∑
m
W (pjm)V νjm,
where pjm are the probabilities and Vjm are the potential values for each outcome m of
option j; ν is the free parameter that determines the curvature of the value function (0 ≤
ν ≤ 1), with lower values reducing the distance between extreme values of rewards; and
W (·) is the probability weighting function. W (·) is defined as:
W (p) = p
ω
(pω + (1− p)ω) 1ω
,
where ω is the free parameter (0 ≤ ω ≤ 5) that determines the curvature of the probability
weighting function. Values of ω below 1 lead to overweighting of rare events, while values
above 1 lead to underweighting of rare events.
Experience (Ej(t))
A simple reinforcement learning model was used to fit the experimental choice data.
This model has extensively been used before in research on repeated decisions from expe-
rience (Erev & Barron, 2005; Lejarraga & Gonzalez, 2011; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005;
Yechiam & Rakow, 2012).
Firstly, observed outcomes are evaluated by a prospect-theory type of utility function
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The utility function vj(t) of option j is defined as:
vj(t) = [payoff j(t)]ν ,
where payoff j(t) is equal to the payoff, in points, at each trial t for each option j, and ν is
same parameter that determines the curvature of the utility function for the description.
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Secondly, expectancies for the value of rewards for each option are formed via a
learning rule, which integrates the experienced feedback after each trial. The learning
rule used was a delta rule, which uses a learning rate that determines how much the new
information gathered via feedback, in the form of prediction error, influences the updating
of the expectancies at each trial (Sutton & Barto, 1998; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005).
Feedback observed is integrated after each trial, to arrive at the experienced expectancy
Ej(t) for option j at time t:
Ej(t) = Ej(t− 1) + φ · {δj(t) + γ · [1− δj(t)]} · [vj(t)− Ej(t− 1)],
where φ is the free learning rate parameter (0 ≤ φ ≤ 1), which is a weight given to new
information observed, with lower values resulting in slower learning. The free parameter γ,
(0 ≤ γ ≤ 1), denotes the weight associated with the feedback of the foregone option, such
that when γ=1 the foregone and observed payoffs are weighted the same, and when γ=0
foregone payoffs are disregarded. The variable δj(t) is a dummy variable, which is equal to
one if option j was chosen on trial t, and zero otherwise.
The weight given to description (ξj(t))
Three different approaches were used to combine description and experience by ma-
nipulating the parameter ξj(t), which is the weight given to description: experience-only,
fixed-weight and Bayesian-updating. Each of these approaches was fitted to the behavioral
data individually, and the fit results were then compared.
Experience-only model. In the experience-only model, no representation of de-
scription was included, with ξj(t) fixed to zero across all trials and options. Therefore, the
final expectancy FEVj(t) was defined to be equal to the expectancy derived from experience
alone, via the reinforcement learning model, Ej(t). This model assumes that descriptions
do not influence the decision making process.
Fixed-weight model. In the fixed-weight model, the weight given to description,
ξj(t), was set as a free parameter, ξ, constant across all trials, options and conditions
(0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1). This model assumes that description influenced the individual choices, but
with a fixed weight that did not depend on the experimental condition and did not change
over time.
Bayesian-updating model. Based on our behavioral results, we observed that
descriptions influenced the decision-making processes in different ways in each experimental
condition. More plausible descriptions seemed to have a stronger influence on decisions than
less plausible ones. We propose a Bayesian-updating model in which the weight given to
description, ξj(t), equals the subjective probability that the description is true on that trial,
given the evidence observed thus far. In this model, the weights given to description will
differ for each option and change over time, according to the experimental conditions.
The Bayesian model assumes that, at each trial, either the description is true, denoted
as Dj(t), or the task is in a different state, denoted as Ej(t), where the probabilities of
rewards are not as described but instead are as experienced. From trial to trial, the state
of the task can change, such that if the description was true on the previous trial, it no
longer is true on the next. The task of a participant is twofold: to determine whether the
task is in state Dj(t) or Ej(t), and to estimate the relevant probabilities of the outcomes
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when the task is in state Ej(t). The probabilities in state Dj(t) do not need to be estimated
as they come from the description itself. Initially it makes sense to rely on the description,
as there is no information to estimate the probabilities of winning in the other state. Over
time however, it is possible to learn that the true probabilities of the outcomes are different
than those described, in which case the weight given to description should diminish. With
this model, less plausible conditions lead to lower weights given to description than more
plausible conditions, thus making this approach more adaptive to the non-monotonicity
observed in the behavioral results than using a fixed weight (Figure 5).
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Figure 5 . Average weights given to description for the risky option (ξrisky) in the two different description-
experience models, based on the best fit parameters, for the conflicting (DEC) conditions only. The Bayesian-
updating approach shows how the weight changes over time according to the accumulation of evidence,
and the plausibility of the description, as measured by the difference between descriptive and experiential
information.
We set the weight given to the description as the Bayesian predicted probability that
the description is true on that trial, ξj(t) = p(Dj(t)|kj(1 : t− 1)). This probability is based
on all the observations made up to the previous trial t − 1, denoted here as kj(1 : t − 1),
which are all the observed outcomes of option j, whether rewards were obtained or not,
from trial 1 to trial t − 1. We will simplify this notation by using a subscript to denote
the information used to calculate the probability, with pt−1(Dj(t)) = p(Dj(t)|kj(1 : t− 1)),
and analogously using pt to include all the information from trial 1 to trial t, kj(1 : t). We
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also assume that the state of the task can change over trials according to the transition
probabilities κD and κE which are free parameters (range: 0-1). κE is the probability that
state Dj is true in trial t if state Ej was true in trial t− 1:
p(Dj(t)|Ej(t− 1)) = κE
and conversely for κD:
p(Ej(t)|Dj(t− 1)) = κD.
The effect of the transition probabilities is to change the prior distributions at each
trial. The prior probability that the description is true on trial t+ 1 for option j is then:
pt(Dj(t+ 1)) = pt(Dj(t)) · (1− κD) + pt(Ej(t)) · κE .
Since one of the two states has to be true at any point, the two probabilities
pt−1(Dj(t)) and pt−1(Ej(t)) are complimentary and the prior probability that state Ej is
true is simply pt−1(Ej(t)) = 1 − pt−1(Dj(t)). The prior pt−1(Dj(t)) and its compliment
pt−1(Ej(t)) can be used to calculate the Bayesian posterior:
pt(Dj(t)) = p(kj(t)|Dj(t))pt−1(Dj(t))
p(kj(t)|Dj(t))pt−1(Dj(t)) + p(kj(t)|Ej(t))pt−1(Ej(t)) .
We set the initial prior, p0(Dj(1)) at the first trial, to be equal to one, since at that
point there was no information experienced so far, and participants had to rely solely on
the descriptive information provided to base their decisions.
According to the descriptive information Dj(t), the probability of a win kj(t) observed
in t if the description holds on trial t is
p(kj(t)|Dj(t)) = pdkj(t)j (1− pdj)(1−kj(t)),
where pdj is the probability for a obtaining a reward for option j as provided by the
description. For example, in Experiment 1, pdj could be either 0.2 or 0.8 for the risky
options, depending on the experimental conditions, and 1.0 for the safe option.
The relevant probabilities for state Ej(t) have to be learned from experience. Assum-
ing that people start with a Beta prior over these probabilities, the posterior distributions
over these probabilities are also Beta distributions, and the likelihood of outcome kj(t) if
the task is in state Ej(t) is
p(kj(t)|Ej(t)) = B(αj(t− 1) + kj(t), βj(t− 1) + 1− kj(t))B(αj(t− 1), βj(t− 1)) ,
where B is the Beta function, and αj(t) and βj(t) are its parameters, which are updated
as follows, with new experiential evidence kj(t) weighed by the probabilities given to Ej(t),
for t ≥ 1:
αj(t+ 1) = αj(t) + pt(Ej(t)) · kj(t);
βj(t+ 1) = βj(t) + pt(Ej(t)) · (1− kj(t)).
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For t = 1 the values of αj(1) and βj(1) are defined by the initial expected value of the
Beta distribution which is set to the probability provided in the description, αj(1)/(αj(1)+
βj(1)) = pdj . We constrained the total weight of the initial Beta prior as a free parameter
S = αj(1) + βj(1) for all options j (1 ≤ S ≤ 5007). Higher values of S led to a slower
accumulation of new evidence towards p(Ej(t)).
Choice rule
After description and experience were integrated into the final expectancy calculation,
FEVj(t), the choice rule used was a time-independent soft-max rule (Yechiam & Busemeyer,
2005) that combined the FEVj across all options at each trial to determine the probability
of choosing option j among all options J :
Pr[Choice(t+ 1) = j] = e
θ·FEVj(t)∑
J e
θ·FEVJ (t) ,
where θ is the choice sensitivity free parameter, (0 ≤ θ ≤ 1). If θ = 0, the model randomly
guesses between the expectancies regardless of their values, while higher values of θ will
lead to more deterministic maximization behavior.
Model fitting
Data sets containing 100 simulated participants were generated for each of the 4
experiments × 6 conditions8, with the same methodology used to generate actual data
sets for the experiments. A total of 2,400 modeled simulated participants were confronted
with 608 observed human participants. All simulated participants across all experiments
and underlying experimental conditions shared the same set of free parameters. The best
fit parameters were found by minimizing the log-likelihood between the average observed
proportions of risky choice and the average model-predicted risky choice for each of the indi-
vidual conditions separately, with each condition receiving the same weight (Erev & Barron,
2005). Because of the different number of parameters between the models, the Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC), which penalizes for additional parameters, was calculated to
compare the models, BIC = LL + f · ln(N), where f is the number of free parameters
and N is the number of fitted observations for each evaluation. Lower BIC values represent
better fitting models.
Model Evaluation and Results
Three models were evaluated: the experience-only model, which did not account
for the influence of descriptive information, with four free parameters; the fixed-weight
model, which assumed a single fixed weight across all trials and all conditions, with six free
parameters; and the Bayesian-updating model, with its reducing weight given to description
over time according to the feedback received, with eight free parameters.
7We also fitted a model in which the experience was initially set to follow a Beta(1,1) distribution,
αj(1) = βj(1) = 1, with an expected value of 0.5. This model also outperformed the fixed-weight model but
by a smaller margin.
8The description-only (D) condition from Experiment 1 was excluded from the cognitive modeling, as it
included a single-shot decision without experience.
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The best fit parameters were relatively consistent across the different models (Table
4). In the best-performing Bayesian-updating model, the modeled influence of description
started at 1 and converged towards a stable level ranging between 0.15 and 0.30 according
to the plausibility of the descriptions (Figure 5). It seems that even after many trials and
despite the large amount of evidence gathered via feedback, participants were still taking
the descriptive information into consideration, albeit at a discounted level; experience never
gained participants’ full attention. This could be explained by the constant presence of
the descriptive information on the buttons, which might have continuously reinforced its
influence. Barron et al. (2008) found a similar lingering influence of descriptive information
even when descriptions were only presented briefly. In comparison, the fixed-weight model
predicted a constant weight given to description of ξ = 0.23 throughout all trials and
conditions.
Table 4
Best fit parameters of the three cognitive models. n.a. = not applicable. Note: the weight
given to description (ξ) in the experience-only model was fixed to zero.
Parameter Bayesian Fixed Experience
updating weight only
ν (curvature of value function) 0.91 0.93 0.92
ω (curvature of probability function) 1.02 1.35 n.a.
φ (learning rate) 0.08 0.08 0.09
γ (foregone’s weight) 0.99 0.96 1.00
θ (choice sensitivity) 0.83 0.80 0.74
ξ (description’s weight) n.a. 0.23 zero (fixed)
κD (switch rate for description) 0.17 n.a. n.a.
κE (switch rate for experience) 0.36 n.a. n.a.
S (Initial Beta prior sum for experience) 454 n.a. n.a.
Total number of free parameters 8 6 4
The results of the model fitting analysis were in line with the behavioral results (Table
5). The mean Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) values for the two description-experience
models were substantially smaller than those for the experience-only model (range: 16-17%
smaller overall; lower BIC values represent better fitting models). Therefore, models that
included the descriptive information provided a better fit for the observed behavior than a
model that did not include the influence of description (Figure 6). The Bayesian-updating
model, which allows for the plausibility of the description as a source of information to
influence the weights given to description and experience, was the best fitting model overall,
with a 17% lower mean BIC value than the experience-only model, and 2% lower than
the fixed-weight model. Among individual conditions, the highest reduction in mean BIC
values was obtained in the DEC conditions, with the Bayesian-updating model 30% lower
than experience-only and 4% lower than fixed-weight models, showing the influence of the
conflicting information on participants’ choices.
The reduction in mean BIC values across all the DES conditions was lower at only
6% when comparing the Bayesian-updating with the experience-only model. This finding is
similar to that found in Lejarraga and Gonzalez (2011), where a model that did not include
descriptions fit the behavioral data relatively well, likely due to the equivalent information
provided by both sources, and where the addition of description did not improve the model
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Table 5
Mean BIC values for the experience-only and description-experience cognitive models fit-
ted on the three groups of experimental conditions: description-experience-conflict (DEC),
description-experience-same (DES) and experience-only (E). Values in brackets are the dif-
ferences in relation to the base model at the top of each column. Lower BIC values represent
better fitting models.
Model Overall DEC DES E
Experience-only (Base) 503 627 417 412
Fixed-weight 425 (-16%) 454 (-28%) 400 (-4%) 410 (-1%)
Bayesian updating 417 (-17%) 437 (-30%) 394 (-6%) 410 (-1%)
fit substantially. While we did observe a small improvement with the description-experience
model, most of the reduction in BIC values came from the first few trials. Comparing the
mean BIC values of the DES conditions between the Bayesian-updating and the experience-
only models, there was a 39% reduction in the first five trials, a 9% reduction in the next
15 trials, and only a small 0.1% reduction in the last 80 trials. While the experiential
information had to be learned over many trials, the descriptive information was available
from the beginning of the task. Thus, if participants were only relying on experience, they
should have chosen randomly in the first few trials until enough information was learned
to steer their decisions, while if participants used descriptions, they could rely on that
information to direct their earlier choices. The reduction in BIC values observed in the DES
condition comes from this earlier availability of descriptive information which helps explain
participants’ choices in the initial trials. According to the behavioral and modeling results,
participants chose in accordance with the descriptions available, showing the influence of
the congruent information as well on their choices.
The largest improvement in model fit among the two description-experience models
was in the DEC conditions of Experiment 3: The mean BIC values of the Bayesian-updating
model were 8% lower than those in the fixed-weight model. In this experiment, we manip-
ulated for the plausibility of the descriptive information. While a fixed-weight model had
a single ξ parameter for all conditions, the Bayesian-updating model was able to adapt to
the different levels of plausibility of the information given (Figure 5), and therefore did a
better job to explain behavior than the fixed-weight model. This is further evidence that,
when the descriptions are implausible, participants give them lower weights in their decision
processes, and vice versa, as predicted by the best fit Bayesian-updating model.
General Discussion
Our aim was to shed additional light on how individuals combine information acquired
by description and by experience when making decisions. The current experiments have
shown that the choice behavior of individuals exposed to a combination of description and
experience is influenced by both sources of information. In support of this, a cognitive
model that included both the descriptive and experiential information fitted the observed
behavior better than a model that relied on experience alone. However, both observed
behavior and fitted cognitive models were significantly influenced by descriptions only when
they provided novel information and not when the description and experience transmitted
the same information. In addition, the influence of experience dominated the influence of
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Figure 6 . Comparison of observed human data, and two cognitive models, for each of the 24 experimental
conditions. The description-experience model shown is the Bayesian-updating model, which is closer to
human behavior than the experience-only model, in particular in the conflicting conditions. Each row shows
data for a separate experiment: from top to bottom, Experiments 1, 2a, 2b and 3. The subscripts after each
D and E indicate the probability of rewards for the risky choice in that condition for the description and
experience respectively, while S stands for same description, C for conflicting description, Cp for plausible
conflict and Ci for implausible conflict.
description, likely driven by the accumulation of experiential information over time. This
caused the influence of descriptive information to be increasingly discounted by individuals;
however, descriptions were still taken into consideration even after many trials. We also
observed that the plausibility of the description has an effect on behavior: only plausible
descriptions influenced behavior monotonically, with a reversal of the effect in the case of
highly implausible descriptions.
Previous research has shown that information provided by experience can overwhelm
descriptions, making experience the preferred source of information (Jessup et al., 2008).
When Lejarraga and Gonzalez (2011) exposed participants to a combination of descriptive
and experiential information, they observed that choice behavior could be explained by
experience alone, as if the descriptive information was neglected. Based on the findings
from the current experiment, an alternative explanation can be considered. Because in
Lejarraga and Gonzalez’s experiment both the description and the experience carried the
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same information, the description might not have been actively disregarded. Instead, it is
possible that because it did not add any relevant information that could not be inferred
from feedback, it did not lead to any observable differences in behavior. In contrast, Barron
et al. (2008) used a paradigm with partial descriptions, which alerted participants to the
presence of a rare negative event. Since most of the participants in their study did not expe-
rience this rare event, the description provided novel information, which in turn influenced
behavior. The addition of descriptions that carried the same information as experience to
the paradigm was therefore not enough to shift behavior - especially under the assumption
that it is ultimately the choice mechanism paradigm (e.g., one-choice/single-outcome versus
repeated-choice/multiple-outcomes; the presence of feedback), not the type of information
presentation, that generates the behavioral differences in the description-experience gap
(Camilleri & Newell, 2013a; Jessup et al., 2008).
Instead of individuals neglecting specific sources of information, participants might
integrate experience with prior beliefs about the outcomes of their choices (Rakow & Newell,
2010), such that different weights are given to each source of information, depending on
their relevance. Prior beliefs could be in the form of descriptions, or come from memory in
pure experience-only conditions. Our results indicate that participants were influenced by
descriptive information, albeit at a discounted rate in comparison to experience. One factor
behind the apparent discounting of descriptive information might be the accumulation of
experiential evidence in the form of feedback after each trial. Alternatively, the discounting
could be explained by the higher costs associated with processing descriptive information
(Lejarraga, 2010). When presented with both descriptive and experiential information,
individuals have to deal with competing sources of control (Fantino & Navarro, 2012).
In addition, there is strong research evidence supporting the evolutionary adaptation of
human-decision making to dynamic environments, which would justify the preference for
experiential information because it reacts more quickly to changes in the environment (for
a review, see Hertwig & Pleskac, 2010).
Even though experiential information was dominant, the discounted influence of de-
scriptive information still remained after many trials. The influence of experience appeared
to grow steeply in the first few trials, but quickly reached an asymptotic level where it
remained for the remainder of the task. Even after many trials, participants still behaved
overall as if description received around a quarter of their decision weight, although this
proportion was influenced by the plausibility of the information, with implausible descrip-
tions receiving lower weights. This finding has implications for research of warning labels:
these are commonly disregarded by individuals, or have limited impact on behavior (e.g.,
Argo & Main, 2004; Wagenaar, Hudson, & Reason, 1990). This phenomenon could be
driven by the heavy discounting of descriptive information, as suggested by Rogers et al.
(2000), and shown here in our modeling results. This implies that where a strong dominant
choice is prescribed by experience, the reduced salience of descriptive information might
not be enough to sway behavior, as observed in Experiment 2. To counteract this apparent
discounting effect, designers of warning labels might be tempted to exaggerate risks and ap-
peal to emotions and personal experience in order to increase compliance. However highly
exaggerated descriptions might become implausible and could have the opposite effect on
behavior, as observed in Experiment 3.
Further exploration of description-plus-experience paradigms, looking at how descrip-
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tive and experiential sources of information are integrated, is crucial for understanding
decision-making. In particular, future research should focus on what determines the weights
given to description and experience, for example, the trustworthiness of different sources of
information, and the importance of descriptions in more complex decision spaces. In some
cases, individuals might discount the experience, and give higher weights to descriptions.
Decision-making biases originally found in descriptive paradigms are not always replicated
in experiential paradigms, and in some instances reversals are observed (e.g., Barron & Erev,
2003; Fantino & Navarro, 2012; Hau et al., 2010). These decision-making biases have been
widely explored in applications such as behavioral interventions, social marketing and gov-
ernmental policy-making. Perhaps the reason why some of these attempted manipulations
are not successful is because the research behind them is based on descriptive paradigms
and applied in experiential settings. More relevant research would be based on real-life ex-
periential situations and would allow for the influence of descriptions and other prior beliefs
by giving them appropriate weightings.
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